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1. Between the devil (objectivism) and the deep blue sea 
(subjectivism) 
Let’s begin under Adorno’s protective wing: 
 
We can tell whether we are happy by the sound of the wind. It 
warns the unhappy man of the fragility of his house, hounding him 
from shallow sleep and violent dreams. To the happy man it is the 
song of his protectedness: its furious howling concedes that it has 
power over him no longer. (Adorno 2005, 49) 
 
As suggestive as this quotation may be, here Adorno says some-
thing inexact (to say the least): he puts wind in the sails of an en-
tirely perceptual subjectivism, thus underestimating the relatively 
invariant affective-expressive qualities of phenomenal reality – in 
this case of the wind, as an outstanding example of quasi-thing 
(Griffero 2017). Without simply being either an accidental prop-
erty of things or a stable and permanent object, in fact, wind felt-
bodily involves our everyday life more and deeper than things in 
the strict sense. 
The issue of happiness raised by Adorno, however, is no 
more problematic than the seemingly less ambitious one of well-
being. Indeed, although it’s gaining increasing momentum as a 
core topic of humanistic research, the least that can be said is that 
well-being is a multifold and very controversial construct. What 
does actually constitute well-being? Can the complexity of human 
behaviour really be captured through simplified paradigms like 
that? Does the current state of the art in well-being studies allow 
for a unified perspective? 
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Instead of fully answering these preliminary questions I’d 
first like to say that well-being should be of fundamental impor-
tance to a philosophy like New Phenomenology, which is focused 
on emotional life and on how individuals feel in their environ-
ment. Nevertheless, this topic is surprisingly not at the heart of 
this new research paradigm. One might think that this is because 
New Phenomenology considers individual well-being as some-
thing that falls outside the sphere of scienti c inquiry, whereby 
declares the relentless decline of any introspectionist psychology. 
However, this is certainly not the case. A subjective appraisal of 
well-being may be considered to be objectively wrong because of 
its inaccuracy, instability and incomparability as well as because it 
does not produce the exact data that would be of use to policy-
makers. However, for New Phenomenology, this is definitely not 
an argument against the central phenomenological role of subjec-
tive-qualitative facts. Indeed, a neo-phenomenological and, as we 
shall see, the atmospherological approach is mainly based on a 
first-person perspective and therefore perfectly entitled to con-
sider subjective well-being as the starting point for a (non-
quantitative) philosophical reflection.  
However, this approach succeeds in doing so without em-
bracing any introjectionist assumption, i.e. without completely re-
ducing the subject to an alleged inner and ineffable psychic world. 
After all, the boom of the notion of atmosphere in philosophy and 
in the humanities (Andermann, Eberlein, 2011; Schmitz 2014; 
Bulka 2015; Böhme 2017a, 2017b; Griffero 2014a, 2017, 2019 
among many others) as well as the renewed success of the notion 
of Stimmung (Gisbertz 2011; Gumbrecht 2012; Reents, Meyer-
Sickendiek 2013; Pfaller, Wiesse 2018) and the propagation, so to 
speak, of a Stimmung for the concept of Stimmung itself (Bude 
2016, 37), must obviously be framed within an explanation ac-
cording to which sentiment (in its various nuances) exceeds Witt-
genstein’s verdict on the linguistic borders of the world – an ex-
planation of the human orientation in the world that is no longer 
exclusively based on reason or language. 
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So let’s go step by step in approaching well-being. As usual, 
it’s best to start from the dichotomization into objective and sub-
jective, a buzzword that afflicts any theory of well-being (Fletcher 
2016). On the one hand there are objective theories of well-being. 
They are grounded on the assumption that that affective-cognitive 
condition can be described either through behaviours and activi-
ties contributing to shaping the good life in accordance with 
shared values, moral principles, and universal features of the 
“human nature”, or through economic data that can be collected 
and accurately measured. Both approaches believe well-being to 
depend on such objective issues as whether a thing or an activity 
satisfies human needs and realises human nature, etc., or whether 
the economic situation of a person or a community has really im-
proved. It is therefore quite normal that objective theories pro-
vide a list of things and activities or statistical and economic data 
they consider to be good for a person. This takes for granted that 
something could be good for a person even if that person did not 
regard it favourably, i.e. that well-being (even if only as a capabil-
ity parameter) has to be regarded as good 1) intersubjectively or 
(2) in a (stronger) realist-correspondentist sense. Unfortunately, 
several studies contradict both these assumptions, showing very 
uncertain relationships, for example, between the position of a 
country in the Human Development Index ranking and the level of 
subjective well-being reported by its citizens. 
Two special variants of this objective approach are repre-
sented by supernaturalists and objectivist naturalists. For the 
former, an encompassing atmosphere of well-being, one that 
proves that our lives are not random or accidental, is only possible 
in a cosmos that is “teleologically structured” by God (or some 
other entity beyond the natural world). For the latter, instead, our 
lives are meaningful to the extent that we engage with objective 
values (the true, the good, or the beautiful, to use traditional 
terms) and our actions affect the realization of these impersonal 
values, without any supernatural entities being involved. Both ob-
viously reject the utilitarian approach, according to which an ac-
tion’s meaning is proportional to its contribution to welfare. 
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Conversely, subjective theories identify well-being with the 
fulfilment of subjectively perceived desires and aspirations and 
assess it based on our attitudes of favour and disfavour. Thus, to 
know if a person is in a state of well-being or not, they must be 
consulted, asked what their preferences are and what their favour 
is for. In short, well-being here would entirely depend on the de-
gree to which one subjectively endorses what one does, whatever 
it is.  
Hence the usual paralysis that comes with dualism: on the 
one side it’s difficult to explain how well-being can be given in the 
absence of subjective satisfaction; on the other it’s difficult to ac-
cept that any activity whatsoever may enhance well-being, so long 
as the subject is pleased about it (the fact that, for example, Sisy-
phus might love pushing a rock up the hill until it rolls down, and 
want to do nothing else, is an implausible exception, because a 
subjective endorsement implies taking pride in what one does). 
From the point of view of atmospherology, according to 
which feelings are more outside than inside, it’s all about not re-
ducing the whole reasoning exclusively to a first- or third-person 
perspective. To conceive of well-being as an atmosphere or, bet-
ter, as a higher-order atmosphere involves exactly the attempt to 
gain relative objectivity without losing the value of subjective 
facts for a person. The point is not simply to claim the importance 
of a mix of first-personal attitudes (pride in what we’ve done, sat-
isfaction with and even excitement about what we’re doing, confi-
dent hope for the future)  or to repeat something self-evident – 
well-being arises from “actively engaging in projects of objective 
worth” (Wolf 2010, 26) or is experienced when “subjective attrac-
tion meets objective attractiveness” (Wolf 1997, 221). Rather, it is 
a matter of stressing that well-being depends above all on how we 
live in our lived spatial environment. Which is why I believe that a 
pathic and atmospheric aesthetics may also legitimately include 
the issue of well-being in its sphere of competence. 
Many researchers think they’re getting away with the para-
lysing dualism by saying that objective and subjective dimensions 
have to be combined in any evaluation of well-being. This idea 
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does certainly make sense. However, my suggestion is a bit differ-
ent, and consists in avoiding both the objectivistic quantitative 
approach, completely dependent on the idea that the world can be 
reliably evaluated in the third person, and the subjectivistic one, 
completely dependent on the introjectionistic-constructionist idea 
that the world can only be viewed and created subjectively in its 
meaning and value. To do so, I’m going to fully use the heuristic 
potential of the aesthetic and neophenomenological notion of at-
mosphere as a feeling poured out into a certain lived, pre-
dimensional space, i.e. as a shared feeling that, while being the 
same, probably triggers relatively different subjective feelings. I 
hope that this approach can provide a deeper insight into the mul-
tiple phenomenological dimensions of well-being, first of all in or-
der to avoid all the many oversimplified and reductionist perspec-
tives that prove unable to see how eudaimonic and hedonic hap-
piness are two correlated constructs and how well-being also de-
pends on cultural and situational constraints. In short: my ap-
proach to well-being as a special, higher-order atmosphere does 
not necessarily have to choose between the devil and the deep 
blue sea, being actually able to reject the strictly objective theo-
ries, the strictly subjective-introjectionist ones, and the reduction-
ism they both inevitably entail. 
 
2. What if well-being is an atmosphere? 
As already mentioned, my working hypothesis is that well-being 
can be defined as a very special atmospheric feeling, a deep mood 
that is both personal and collective (with all the problems entailed 
by the possible interaction or conflict of these two different di-
mensions). The legitimacy of this aesthetic and phenomenological 
assumption obviously relies on a definition of the phenomenon 
that does not focus, as far as possible, on its economic, psychologi-
cal, medical and legal aspects, but that instead interprets the no-
tion in terms of vital feeling. From this perspective, well-being is a 
feeling, certainly more stable and enduring than other simple feel-
ings and, a fortiori, than emotions. Precisely because of its low af-
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fective intensity, it also can be compared to what the philosophical 
tradition refers to as Stimmung1 or, more tentatively, as mood. 
Let’s try to make this a little bit clearer. Speaking of well-
being in an atmospheric way does not only mean claiming that a 
mood may be a general indicator of well-being and thus probably 
provide a function in terms of self-regulation; rather it means stat-
ing that well-being itself can be considered a (more or less posi-
tive) Stimmung or, if you will,  a kind of composite atmosphere. 
When, for example, one makes the generic sweeping statement 
that people in our society are inclined to an accelerationist-
technological optimism (the Silicon Valley model) or to a fatalistic-
mystical egocentricity (the bucolic buen retiro and/or yoga 
model), one is undoubtedly trying to establish, although with dif-
ficulty and a high rate of generality, what the prevailing Stimmung 
is and what kind and degree of well-being it implies. If we wanted 
to accept De Rivera’s classification (to which we will return later), 
well-being should coincide with the intersubjective-social emo-
tional climates that reflect longer-term sociopolitical conditions. 
In my view, well-being does not coincide with any single atmos-
phere, being rather the result, the condensation if you prefer, of 
different more localized and transitory atmospheric feelings. More 
precisely, taking up here my distinction between prototypical, de-
rived and spurious (or idiosyncratic) atmospheres, I propose to 
assimilate well-being to the prototypical ones, which are objec-
tive, external and whose origin is and remains largely obscure. 
The greater spatial pervasiveness and temporal extension of well-
being make it not just a composite atmosphere but a real higher-
order atmosphere. 
Conceived in this way, well-being is an evaluation (in a 
broad sense) devoid of a real focus and yet able to induce a certain 
perception (also more atmospherically localized) of one’s situa-
tion; in other terms, your well-being lets you decide what you per-
ceive or experience and how you perceive or experience it (some-
                                                          
1 It’s important not to overestimate the alleged untranslatability and ineffability of the 
term Stimmung (David 2004), if only because declaring that something is untranslatable 
means comparing any translation of it with the original. 
52 Lebenswelt, 15 (2019) 
 
times even prejudicially or in a conformist way, just think of the 
spiral of silence), and it’s a precondition for you to be able to run 
risks or to wish to take your time to observe something carefully, 
instead of seeking distractions, etc. Here one can hardly avoid a 
certain degree of hermeneutical parts-whole circularity, because 
on the one hand well-being probably results from the accumula-
tion of momentary atmospheric situations connoted in a certain 
way and finally condensed into a holistic overall feeling without a 
real intentional object, while, on the other, those occasional at-
mospheric situations in turn are already tonalized in a certain way 
and therefore experienced on the background of some Stimmung 
(i.e. of a certain degree of well-being). 
Due to (or thanks to) this affective circularity between single 
atmospheres and well-being as a higher-order atmosphere or 
Stimmung, it can be said that what we experience on the back-
ground of a mostly tacit Stimmung – which determines both which 
worldly entities we encounter and how we do so – in turn con-
tributes, at least imperceptibly, to the modification of the overall 
Stimmung itself. It is not necessary to agree with the primacy that 
Heidegger assigns to the Stimmung of anguish and deep boredom, 
every objectification-focus of which would be nothing more than a 
form of removal and therefore an inauthentic affective situation 
(Befindlichkeit), in order to accept the idea that, like every Stim-
mung, well-being also provides pre-theoretical evidence and cer-
tainty to our being-in-the-world.  
In short, well-being is therefore both an atmospheric prem-
ise and an atmospheric result. It acts as a background, from which 
various figures and even antithetical orientations can emerge, as 
in the case of both dissidence and fatalism with regards to capital-
ism, now free from the illusion of perennial growth: those are two 
affective and well-being-related reactions to the same higher-
order atmosphere that we could call ‘irritability’. Just as any other 
Stimmung, moreover, well-being can never truly be absent: it is 
always there, even if unconsciously.  Just as silence necessarily 
implies a certain kind of communication, not feeling any Stim-
mung is in turn a Stimmung (Bude 2016, 22), and not feeling well-
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being means probably feeling a certain (very low, clearly) degree 
of situational well-being. 
In this context, well-being might also be considered as an ex-
istential feeling, that is, as Matthew Ratcliffe (2008) reminded us, 
as a feeling of bodily state and at the same time as a way of ex-
periencing things outside the body. By the way, whether it is an 
existential feeling or a higher-order atmosphere, well-being is still 
a (relatively conscious) ‘affective’ state that prefigures all ways of 
finding oneself in the world and thus provides an orientation 
through which experience as a whole is structured. What is deci-
sive for an atmospherological approach, however, is that even 
those who, when asked about their well-being, answer, for exam-
ple, “I feel strange or confused”, are not just saying something 
about themselves but something pre-propositional about the 
world as such.2 In other terms, for them “everything feels strange 
or confused”.  
Nevertheless, more than detailing this pre-articulate atmos-
pheric sphere that I have dealt with on many other occasions, it is 
now worthwhile to further problematize my suggestion (i.e. the 
atmospheric nature of well-being), by bringing to light many of 
the doubts that weigh both on the notion of well-being as such and 
on its explanation in atmospheric terms. 
 
3. A quicksand of doubts 
a) In praise of ‘indirectness’. The first unavoidable question is 
whether and how well-being, also as an atmosphere, can be inves-
tigated and verified. Provided that each object requires its own 
specific method of investigation, what might be the most suitable 
in this case? Being an integral part of our daily lives, can well-
being as an atmosphere, be really empirically objectified and stud-
ied? My suggestion is to re-evaluate the scientific value of ‘impres-
sions’, even, if not above all, of the first ones, since they are caused 
by involuntary and certainly unintentional vital experiences. Be-
                                                          
2 “Belonging to the world is a pre-articulate, practical orientation and any attempt to re-
construct it in propositional terms is an over-intellectualisation of something that is pre-
supposed by propositional thought” (Ratcliffe 2008, 178). 
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ing soft facts (tranquillity, trust, community, natural beauty, etc.) 
(Grossheim, Kluck, Nörenberg 2014), impressions are in this con-
text more revealing than alleged hard facts such as economic 
situation, demographic problems, unemployment, physical fitness, 
etc., and this is so not despite but precisely by virtue of their axio-
logical impenetrability (if one can say so). 
But here we immediately stumble upon the source of all 
doubts. It is the same paradox as that resulting from the concep-
tualization of happiness and the question of the producibility of 
atmospheres, resulting in a performative fallacy. It can be summa-
rised in the following formula: “to achieve  well-being, forget 
about it”. Only in this way, with any luck, will well-being come: 
that is, as a by-product of pursuing meaningful activities and rela-
tionships. If one is reasonably successful in those activities, well-
being may follow. This very widespread paradox brings to light 
the fact that pursuing well-being directly and deliberately is self-
defeating or otherwise very problematic. Focusing our attention 
on our well-being through excessive critical scrutiny of our feel-
ings actually erodes our well-being, as we feel that it is  always in-
sufficient or does not live up to our expectations or our imagina-
tion.3 Kant, for example, reminds us that “the more a cultivated 
reason purposely occupies itself with well-being, so much the fur-
ther does one get away from true well-being” (Kant 1996, 51). 
Making it a little easier: well-being needs indirectness rather than 
excessive self-seeking and self-preoccupation, because it cannot 
be pursued directly but only through other things that in turn 
must be sought not as means but for their own sake. 
This paradox also challenges the widely held belief that ob-
taining certain things and specific results will automatically in-
crease our well-being, and valorises, on the contrary, the idea that 
well-being has less to do with acquiring what we seek than with 
the journey we embark on by seeking it. It’s well known that 
sometimes “anticipation is better than realization”, or, put in my 
terms, that protention is sometimes more atmospheric than reali-
                                                          
3  Mill, Sidgwick and Kant agree on this point, though of course with partly different ar-
guments. 
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zation. This suggests that well-being comes from positive atti-
tudes concerning the future, such as hope, faith, and optimism: 
that is, not from getting what we hope for, but rather from the im-
pact of these future-oriented attitudes and their positive thoughts 
on the present.  
Moreover, this paradox also problematizes any question ex-
plicitly aimed at verifying the well-being of an individual and/or a 
community. This casts an equivocal light on the statistical tools 
normally used in sociological surveys (questionnaires and inter-
views). It actually seems that sincere answers about one’s well-
being only emerge when one is not expressly asked about it. As 
I’ve already mentioned, thetical questioning of well-being imme-
diately evokes relatively misleading theoretical constructs in both 
the questioner and the respondent. It is therefore preferable to 
resort to indirect questions, from the answers to which one can 
then infer something about the central question. It is an oblique 
method, if you will, which does not start from definitions but from 
how one feels here and now, and consists above all in avoiding 
strictly quantitative methodologies obsessed by omnipresent dia-
grams and tables. In conclusion, it goes beyond the examination 
carried out by strictly statistical questionnaires and does not ask 
direct questions about one’s level of well-being. 
From my point of view, a neo-phenomenological and atmos-
pherological approach to well-being avoids all the strictly socio-
economic indicators that best represent development, preferring 
to focus (albeit indirectly) on the identification of subjective feel-
ings, in a sense on what it is like to be me or you. To those who be-
lieve, for example, that the quality of political life might be meas-
ured by simply asking people how much they trust each other and 
their government, it can be argued that there is no clear empirical 
evidence of a positive relationship between governmental policy 
performance and citizens’ political trust and participation – let 
alone their felt-bodily (individual and collective) resonance, 
which, after all, is what matters most in an atmospherological 
conception of well-being. 
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In summary: it does not seem possible to pursue well-being 
directly, nor does it seem possible to investigate its degree di-
rectly. And there’s more: many other problems come up immedi-
ately. 
 
b) How widespread is it? Let’s assume that well-being is a higher-
order atmosphere. Hence other problems, the first of which is to 
establish how widespread it is, i.e. what its spatial and temporal 
boundaries are. Despite the constitutive vagueness of the theme 
under investigation, a phenomenological orientation cannot fail to 
ask such a question if it aims at achieving some precision, for ex-
ample if it wishes to go beyond the (albeit correct) assertion of the 
holistic and, so to speak, Gestaltic character of well-being, thus 
understood as a whole irreducible to its individual components. 
And this question needs an ontological-methodological reflection 
to be answered. I will come back to this point.  
For now it is enough to ask if, for example, it is legitimate to 
talk about different affective zones and climates even if they are 
simultaneous and neighbouring. The problem becomes more 
complicated when the question concerns the atmospheric well-
being of a historical period and/or a community, because one runs 
the risk of levelling out disparate emotional tones: think of the 
very different Stimmungen affecting an immigrant or a resident, a 
man or a woman, an “apocalyptic” or an “integrated” intellectual 
(Eco 2000, 17-35), a permanent or a precarious worker, etc. 
 
c) What about its intensity? Does well-being necessarily certify an 
increase in the intensity with which one experiences what hap-
pens? The question makes sense, because it does not seem at all 
irrational to prefer a life that steadily delivers medium pleasures 
over a life of wild oscillations (i.e., a series of intense pleasures 
and intense pains), even if this second life features a greater 
amount of pleasure overall. Yet some prefer the so-called “James 
Dean effect” (Diener, Derrick, Shigehiro 2001, 157) and think that 
a triumphal life is better than years of positive but mediocre value.  
57 Tonino Griffero 
 
 
One could rightly suggest that those who believe in the 
James Dean effect are misled by their aesthetic intuitions from the 
outside, because “Dean’s actual life makes for a better story than 
the imagined longer life, but this clearly has nothing to do with 
whether it is a better life for him” (Bradley 2009, 160). Another 
objection is that prejudice in favour of the James Dean effect gives 
too much importance to the last phase of one’s experience (end) 
or to the emotionally stronger moment (peak) of it, rather than to 
the whole of one’s experiences, thereby uncritically repeating the 
well-known but misleading feeling that the value of later-
occurring goods is greater than that of previous ones. Here’s an 
example that seems very telling to me: common sense tells us that 
our well-being would soar permanently if we won a multimillion-
dollar lottery, and it would sink irreversibly if we lost our sight. 
Nevertheless, it seems proven that these emotional highs and lows 
do occur, but only for a short time and that, in tune with our range 
of happiness, within a year from these events, levels of happiness 
and therefore of well-being usually return to about where they 
were before (Brickman, Coates, Janoff-Bulman 1978). 
 
d) Doubts about the comparison and development of well-being 
over time. One may also wonder whether well-being is immedi-
ately felt, through a sort of special self-reflection evidently en-
dowed with transparency, or whether it becomes perceptible only 
ex post, that is, if examined at a certain distance and only by com-
paring one’s current situation with the previous one (be it one’s 
own or the general one). The comparison cannot actually be es-
caped, because when we experience something we also always 
seek justification in the eyes of others, also compared with their 
experiences our other ones. This powerful conditioning is inher-
ent in human nature, but it has intensified in the postmodern 
world, where belief in objectively defensible values is at risk or 
has evaporated altogether. This is consistent with the widespread 
psychological finding that our well-being (or our unhappiness), 
for example that which we draw from consumption of goods, de-
pends primarily on the comparison with others’ consumption 
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standards. In other words, well-being as a composite atmosphere 
depends on, both in the experience we have of it and in expressing 
it in a propositional form if asked about it, and is highly condi-
tioned by this sort of “negative externality”– which in turn, of 
course, is atmospherically perceived. 
However, the relationship between well-being and tempo-
rality is more complex than that. In fact, it is reasonable to think 
that an atmosphere of well-being is perceived only in the presence 
of a historical course perceived as an improvement with respect 
to the past or to other people.4 The problem actually affects every 
atmospheric perception. Although the perception of well-being as 
an atmosphere is linked to the immediacy of the here and now, of 
a certain lived space and a certain presentness, one cannot ignore 
that it also has its own temporal dynamics, so much so that shifts 
in our attitudes and experiences can alter our assessments of 
when and to what extent we were well during other periods of our 
lives. By living longer and more deeply, we could indeed acquire a 
wider range of comparisons to use in assessing our lives. This 
means that our attitudes can shift, so that it makes sense to say, 
for example, “I thought I could never be happier than I was in my 
youth, but now I know that was an illusion”. It should not be un-
derestimated, as evidence of the key role of our first atmospheric 
impressions, that even in this case the alleged happy atmosphere 
lived in youth does not cease to be happy, at least insofar as it acts 
as a paradigm of the following affective experiences. Therefore, 
our conception of atmospheric well-being has to be dynamic 
rather than static.  
Another well-known mental ‘cramp’ related to temporality is 
that processes that go from bad to good are considered to be bet-
ter and preferable than processes that go from good to good, and 
obviously than those going from good to bad. This is what re-
search has called “treadmills”. A lot of money simply feeds a “he-
                                                          
4 People with chronic diseases or disabilities often perceive themselves as ordinary men 
and women coping with extraordinary circumstances and, as a consequence, report 
good levels of well-being (Delle Fave 2013, 9-10). 
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donic treadmill”: the more we buy and have, the more we want. 
Testifying to our continuous adaptation to circumstances, this 
means that economic growth only satisfies us for some time, be-
cause with a growing availability come greater desires, so that we 
return to our previous state of dissatisfaction (think of the distinc-
tion between needs and desires, Böhme 2017c). So, when some-
body says that governments should aim at maximizing their citi-
zens’ consumerist happiness and well-being, they are forgetting 
the risks of reducing policies to products, which would end up 
generating in citizens a spiral of progressively rising expectations 
that in principle would be impossible to fulfil.  
Finally, one can’t forget the fundamental gap concerning the 
relationship between momentary experiences of well-being and 
long-lasting well-being. Hence the need to a) not mistake potential 
well-being with the actual state of well-being; to b) pay attention 
to the fact that small doses of well-being do not necessarily add up 
to greater well-being; finally c) to acknowledge that the well-being 
based on momentary pleasurable experiences, which come from 
satisfying homeostatic needs such as hunger, sex, and bodily com-
fort, is quite different from a well-being based on longer-term en-
joyable experiences, that is, on good feelings that people experi-
ence when, with time and effort, they do or become something 
that goes beyond what they were. 
These are just some examples of the difficulties faced by an 
analysis of well-being based on a time paradigm. Indeed, even the 
most quantitative theories add further difficulties. In macroeco-
nomic terms, the paradox of economic growth, for example, is well 
known: average incomes in Western democracies have doubled 
over the last fifty years, but levels of happiness seem to have re-
mained virtually unchanged. I am a long way from the Miserism 
International to which many philosophers have affiliated and 
which is well mocked by Sloterdijk (2016), but I don't think it’s 
wrong to assume that excessive concern for safety, comfort, and 
material well-being ends up being detrimental to optimal devel-
opment. In other terms: money contributes to well-being less than 
we usually believe. It immediately and powerfully increases peo-
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ple’s well-being by rescuing them from poverty, but thereafter it 
contributes little to it. What partly explains “this surprising result 
is that we tend to misuse money once we have it, thus becoming 
caught up in endless routines of getting and spending, rather than 
building wealth to increase freedom and peace of mind” (Martin 
2013, 38). 
 
e) Consistency and continuity of well-being. The concept of well-
being as a higher-order atmosphere may assume peculiar rele-
vance if understood as a balance rather than as the maximization 
of positive affect. The problem arises especially when well-being 
is identified with meaningfulness, that is, with what one could de-
fine as a life rich in purpose and direction, pride and self-esteem, 
fulfilment and depth, autonomy and maybe joy on the part of the 
agent, and admiration and inspiration on the part of others. Nev-
ertheless, the degree of meaningfulness of one’s life is always de-
termined not only by the objective value of the projects and the 
degree to which the agent is suited to and engaged by them, but 
also by the degree to which these projects add up to a balanced 
and coherent whole. As Kauppinen (2012, 368) reminds us, the 
value of a series of achievements is enhanced when these 
achievements complement and build on one another and thus give 
well-being a “progressive” shape by which earlier activities posi-
tively inform the later ones. 
    
4. The pathic way to well-being 
As already mentioned, one of the main questions is whether well-
being can only be pursued indirectly as the by-product of mean-
ingful activities and relationships, and can only be recognised in-
directly as the by-product of reflections (and questions) about 
something else. The pathic solution I’m suggesting involves two 
options. The first one goes by the name of “flow”. 
   1) Referring to the metaphor of a current that carries one 
along effortlessly, adopting the flow means (Csikszentmihalyi 
2014) focusing on the process of living well (eudaimonic ap-
proach) rather than on the outcomes of this process (hedonic ap-
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proach). It implies engaging in valued activities and experiences 
that challenge us, while providing immediate and positive feed-
back, regardless of whether episodic pleasures are involved. This 
intense experiential involvement in moment-to-moment activity 
shows three additional subjective characteristics: a) a loss of self-
consciousness, since attentional resources are fully invested in the 
task at hand; b) a lack of anxiety about losing control, which 
makes people’s daily lives tiring; lastly c) an altered sense of time, 
since, in the ow, the moment-to-moment activity does not allow 
one to focus on the experience of duration (Friedman 1990), so 
that people report time passing quickly or faster than normal. Ac-
cording to these features, well-being could consist in the atmos-
phere which these flow-experiences, relatively rare in everyday 
life, are immersed in.  Everything seems to be able to produce a 
flow, as soon as clear proximal goals structure experience effec-
tively, providing both a balance between perceived (not necessar-
ily present) challenges and perceived (not necessarily present) 
skills, neither overmatching nor underutilizing them, and immedi-
ate feedback about the progress that is being made. Relative un-
awareness and full dedication to what is being pursued leave the 
individual with little doubt about what to do next. 
 Well-being as a higher-order atmosphere might be a condi-
tion that allows us to live as many flow-experiences as possible, 
that is, activities that promote an intrinsically rewarding experi-
ential involvement and, for this very reason, depend more on mo-
tivations and processes than on functional terms and outcomes. 
An atmospheric crisis could occur in a person or in a society, in 
fact, when they or it fail to nd enjoyment in a productive life and 
need both increasingly elaborate means of control and repression, 
and arti cial stimulations to be productive. In my view, activities 
that are so wasteful and disruptive as to interrupt the flow or 
make it impossible both contribute to, and follow from, the gen-
eration of wider toxic atmospheres. 
 Consequently, the higher-order atmosphere of well-being 
should consist in complete absorption in what one is doing, being 
and allowing for an autotelic activity that is never dictated by a 
62 Lebenswelt, 15 (2019) 
 
pre-existing intentional structure located within the person (a 
drive) or in the environment (a tradition or script), i.e. rewarding 
in and of itself to such an extent that the end goal is just an excuse 
for the process itself. Atmospheric well-being would therefore be 
recognizable by its acting as a facilitating framework that pushes 
one to do things for their own sake. Nevertheless, to avoid any 
temptation to fall into a melioristic pragmatism, it must be 
stressed that attention and deliberate planning don’t play a key 
role in the ow and that this kind of experience should be under-
stood in a more pathic and (in a broad sense) passive key. The 
widespread trend towards constructionism of many flow theorists 
must also be avoided. Indeed, it’s not true that one can nd a ow 
in almost any activity (working at a cash register or washing 
clothes) and find instead pleasant activities (going to the cinema 
or playing football) boring and anxiogenic , as if only subjective 
challenges and skills, and not objective ones, could really in uence 
the quality of one’s experience. Atmospheres  (including that of 
well-being) are quasi-objective , they are pervasively present in 
the lived space outside individuals, and act as quasi-things, felt-
bodily involving individuals and groups and sometimes even re-
sisting their effort to change or neutralise them5: all this helps de-
feat any radical constructivism, according to which all feelings 
only exist within individuals and are therefore at their disposal, so 
much so that when people perceive them in their environment it 
is only because they have first unconsciously projected them out-
side. All this also helps show that self-consciousness does not at 
all coincide with felt-bodily non-affectivity. Being now conserva-
tive and now expansive, well-being, atmospherically understood, 
is actually a comprehensive affective situation making life better 
and more fluid even from a felt-bodily point of view, thus avoid-
ing, for example, the wish to be elsewhere and to do something 
else. 
 2) On the basis of this felt-bodily approach to the philoso-
phy of atmospheres I can say that an individual’s flow is the reso-
                                                          
5 For atmospheric authority cf. Griffero (2014b). 
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nance of a more general atmosphere of well-being that still needs 
to be investigated. However, in order to better understand this 
pathic approach to well-being it is necessary to keep in mind that 
this resonance sometimes consists in accepting, rather than in 
fully resolving, conflicts. In smell-the-roses moments, for example, 
affirmation and keeping things the way they are seem to be the 
simplest of things, for in these cases goodness and beauty seem to 
be everywhere if only we are attuned to them. As Epictetus 
teaches: “Do not seek to have events happen as you want them to, 
but instead want them to happen as they do happen, and your life 
will go well” (Epictetus 1983, 13). The paradox of a felt-bodily 
submission is that, as is well known, surrendering to what hap-
pens and losing control can liberate us in ways that contribute to 
well-being. As Frankfurt (1989, 89) put it, “a person may be en-
hanced and liberated through being seized, made captive, and 
overcome” by an object, because they are “guided by its character-
istics rather than primarily by [their] own”.  
 This pathic concept of well-being, according to which per-
sons are at their best when they “have lost or escaped from 
[themselves]” (Frankfurt 1989, 89), obviously sharply conflicts 
with the post-Enlightenment belief that the autonomy and arbi-
trariness of the individual, considered as such to be positive quali-
ties, are increased by multiplying the number of options. We know 
from experience that multiplying options sometimes lessens our 
happiness by ruining the atmosphere of well-being: too many 
choices can be burdensome, because they place responsibility 
(and potentially blame) on us, but also because evaluating options 
takes time and adds complexity and confusion. We are sometimes 
actually more satisfied when our decisions are not so easily re-
versible and, committing in a spirit of permanence, we do not feel 
free to walk away at any time. I know this may sound like an old 
wife’s tale, regressive if not masochistic, but I think it’s worth re-
peating that, except in extreme cases, we really feel atmospheric 
well-being only when we grapple with sufficient options to avoid 
boredom, but also let ourselves go to what happens and (in a 
sense) decides for us. Is it really so irrational and regressive to 
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think that we probably already have everything we need to ex-
perience well-being, and we must only change our attitudes? To 
focus on what we already have and on our present instead of pur-
suing happiness outside ourselves and in the future: this is the 
first aspect, controversial but stimulating after centuries of hyper-
rationalism, of a pathic way to well-being. 
 Nevertheless, what better qualifies this approach and takes 
it beyond a stoic mood, as already mentioned, is the effort to root 
well-being as atmosphere or historical climate (in a non-
metaphorical sense) in some felt-bodily disposition. This is the 
witness and the filter, subjective but also collective when it takes 
the form of a felt-bodily “style”, of that atmosphere. Therefore, 
well-being presents itself as an atmosphere experienced by the 
felt body, without coming exclusively from it (being at most fa-
voured by it). It only ceases to be latent in particular cases, ex-
pressing itself externally in a specific way: consider the emblem-
atic case of art. Just as the sound of a trumpet in baroque music 
seems to felt-bodily correspond to a certain corporeal tonality of 
that historical period (brilliance and agility), so the degree of well-
being of a historical period could be seen in the kind of felt-bodily 
communication (Griffero 2016, 2017b, 2017c) that individuals of 
that period establish with others and with things. Members of a 
certain community might not feel exactly the same thing, but at 
least share a certain “style” of feeling, an affective and cognitive 
aftertaste that does not necessarily coincide with their entire in-
dividual biography. Since there is no collective organ of common 
feeling, they are perhaps only made aware of this style by the 
feedback of the cultural products of that time. In other terms, they 
only realize how they are feeling as a community through the style 
of their lives and works and/or when differences and conflicts 
emerge.  
 Leaving aside the controversial question of whether such 
felt-bodily affectivity is experienced in an individual way and later 
extended to others or is experienced as something collective and 
shared from the beginning, my thesis is that collective well-being 
is an atmospheric feeling or a higher-order atmosphere that syn-
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thesizes a historical climate. It provides individuals with an over-
all existential style that is expressed in their overall felt-bodily 
state and attitude. One obviously has to go beyond Bourdieu’s so-
ciological “habitus” as the mere reflection of a certain social posi-
tion, as well as beyond Searle’s analytical idea of an implicit back-
ground to linguistic-social action as a merely conventional and 
mental-individualistic state. The concept of atmosphere or emo-
tional climate, I think, is able both to recognize and enhance the 
right autonomy of the affective sphere and to focus on the atmos-
phere of well-being understood as a collective phenomenon.  
 For this very reason, the concept of atmosphere, especially 
if applied to a repeated and longer-term non-temporary state, act-
ing therefore as a higher-order atmosphere, borders with that of 
situation. In fact, a collective atmosphere is shared because its 
widespread affective quality identifies and distinguishes one 
situation from the other, leading those who are inside it to what is 
salient or not, possible or not, etc. That is why every discussion on 
the collective atmosphere of well-being also requires an in-depth 
examination of the possible types of situation. Using Hermann 
Schmitz’s broad classification, it could be said that a situation is 
present or long-standing, impressive or segmented, deeply rooted 
or only inclusive, and that there are, as a consequence, different 
forms of atmosphere sharing, whose binding power depends both 
on the felt-bodily disposition of the people involved and on the 
degree of the atmosphere’s situational rootedness. To give just 
one example, some atmospheric feelings remain the same even 
when they are rejected and not shared (a landscape, for example, 
may be melancholic as such even if the spectator is happy), while 
others, more resonance-conditioned, exist only when they are 
embodied and shared: without people who are feeling well, for 
example, there can be no atmosphere of well-being, exactly as 
without brave people there can be no atmosphere of courage. 
 Nevertheless, it’s clear that there is a big difference between 
the atmosphere that, for example, I am experiencing this morning 
on the streets near my house and the atmosphere of well-being 
that surrounds me in the long run and that, encouraging or de-
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pressing me, distinguishes a neighbourhood, a city, a country and 
even a historical era. In order to better understand well-being as a 
pervasive and durable emotional phenomenon, Joseph De Rivera’s 
distinction among three types of collective affective states may 
also be useful. He distinguishes between a) transitory emotional 
atmospheres as short-term, situation-related affective group ex-
periences focused on a particular common event (a funeral, a col-
lective situation, a party, etc.), b) intersubjective-social emotional 
climates reflecting longer-term socio-political conditions and also 
referring to how the people of a given society emotionally relate 
to one another (for example taking care of one another etc.), lastly 
c) broad affective cultures, that is, long-lasting situations. These 
collective states, considered objective by De Rivera (1992) be-
cause they are perceived as existing apart from individual feelings, 
also interact and influence each other, meaning, for example, that 
emotional climates depend on the underlying affective culture, 
and both influence, and in turn are affected by, emotional atmos-
pheres. Similarly, one could say that a certain individual and mo-
mentary atmospheric well-being (even as a spurious atmosphere) 
interacts, in ways to be investigated, with a certain atmospheric 
well-being understood as a more extended climate in time and 
space (derivative atmosphere), as well as with a certain affective 
culture characterized by its own level of well-being (prototypical 
atmosphere). In short: a certain degree and quality of collective 
and long-term well-being summarizes and condensates in an 
overall state the well-being quality of localized emotional climates 
and even idiosyncratic-temporary atmospheres. Thus differenti-
ated, well-being as an atmosphere proves to be, in a sense, both an 
outcome (as a higher-order atmosphere) and a premise (as a sin-
gle atmosphere) of our everyday affective life.  
 Let me offer an example that brings to light all the difficul-
ties entailed by applying this theoretical construct. At first glance, 
it is very easy to say that, for example, a community dominated by 
fear of the future, whose perceived well-being is consequently 
rather low, certainly “breathes” a negative atmosphere (as an 
emotional climate and even as a broad affective culture), which in 
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turn crystallizes in multiple points of condensation, more or less 
justified and predictable, of temporary or longer duration. But 
what is really responsible for the atmospheric well-being of this 
community? This question is hard to answer, but what’s certain is 
that if well-being comes from some basic human emotions, it 
makes little sense to look for its cause in specific political, eco-
nomic, cultural, etc. situations. In fact, nobody can confidently 
claim either that politics generates a collective mood and is there-
fore responsible of it, or that politics is just a reflection of a previ-
ous affective culture and simply uses it for its own purposes, for 
example by enhancing atmospheres within which the leadership’s 
initiative is readily accepted, etc.  
 More concretely, suppose we want to investigate the atmos-
pheric well-being of Italians today.  We’d probably say that they 
live in an atmosphere of instability, meaning that people cannot 
predict what will happen either politically or economically in the 
near future, and even single persons can’t know what to expect or 
what to do. This very question – what is the Italian well-being like 
as a higher-order atmosphere or historical climate? – shows all its 
ambiguity and complexity. Talking about instability, distrust of in-
stitutions, populism, mistrust of the future, paranoid need of iden-
tity, etc. is not so specific as not to apply to other countries. More-
over, it’s very difficult to conclusively establish how many indi-
viduals (including maybe imaginary ones) and what time-frame a 
collective atmosphere of well-being involves, as it is not clear how 
temporally and geographically extended a collective atmosphere 
(including that of well-being) is. Indeed, one always runs the risk 
of adopting different standards of comparison, confusing for in-
stance aspirations (what people would like to happen), entitle-
ments (what has to happen) and observations (what happens), 
temporary and more lasting moods, strictly personal-characterial 
feelings and collective moods. Needless to say, that quantitative 
studies, which often simply reflect the public’s perception even 
when they try to predict how the public will behave, seriously un-
derestimate that people of different neighbourhoods, regions, so-
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cial classes, families, ages, etc., may perceive their time quite dif-
ferently.  
 Most people, for example, seem to find relatively few con-
nections between their personal and the national situation, being 
rather influenced by the atmosphere of their home or of the me-
dia. Similarly, optimists and pessimists, the elite and members of a 
minority group, people of different professional or health satisfac-
tion, etc, may well perceive their atmospheric well-being differ-
ently. Aggregate macro-studies are not of much help, since people 
responding to questionnaires on well-being might be afraid or 
ashamed of saying what they really feel, or simply say what they 
believe the others want to hear. Do replies to a questionnaire re-
flect the way individuals feel their environment or simply how 
they think the majority is feeling? Is the shared atmosphere of a 
community the feeling it really prefers (a quiet never-changing 
life, for example), or is it rather that which it dreams of (a more 
adventurous life)? Is well-being what people feel at home or what 
they feel, by contrast, when they are talking to strangers or tem-
porarily live abroad, and unexpectedly realize (and appreciate) 
the state of well-being they unwittingly enjoyed at home? Does it 
make sense to rely on the usual method that tries to measure the 
tension between ideal and real, provided that a utopian, for in-
stance, tries to bring these two dimensions closer together? Or 
else, is the atmospheric well-being a feeling in act now (the dis-
trust of a current authoritarian policy, for example) or a long-
standing one (the confidence in the long-term democratic reliabil-
ity of the country)? Even the feeling of being lonely and distrustful 
of any collective dimension, which is an obvious condition con-
trary to well-being, can be shared and sometimes unexpectedly 
engender a certain level of well-being, for example by reinforcing 
the social cohesion and positive affect within a smaller social 
group that feels different from, and better than, the rest of the 
population.  
 As you can easily see, looking into well-being as a higher-
order atmosphere is like walking on quicksand. Nevertheless, this 
doesn’t mean that it is superfluous to keep asking what well-being 
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is and how to feel it, or that one must entirely rely on seemingly 
resolutive quantitative tools. The situation is therefore difficult 
but not desperate, because in our everyday perceptual and affec-
tive life we surely and continuously experience affective fields, 
which are almost never totally subjective and are often reinforced 
by a common narrative and physical setting. To a shared atmos-
pheric well-being different individual can obviously react with 
more or less different – sometimes even antithetic – individual 
emotions, yet they are still reacting, more than it may seem, to a 
common affective field that is poured out in their lived space and 
time. As already said, well-being as a higher-order atmosphere is 
the relatively enduring affective quality of the overall environ-
ment but also the temporary affective quality of an individual. 
 As regards the objection about the vagueness that allegedly 
invalidates any atmospheric consideration, one can answer that 
vagueness is consubstantial to any atmospheric perception and it 
would therefore be grotesque to delude oneself into eliminating it 
by means of a rigorous quantitative method. The atmospherologi-
cal approach can only be as scientific as its object of investigation, 
and must not at all ape the naturalistic-scientific method. After all, 
as Massumi reminds us with the necessary cynicism, the latter “is 
the institutionalized maintenance of sangfroid in the face of sur-
prise” and “properly […] starts from a pre-conversion of surprise 
into cognitive con dence” (Massumi 2002, 233). But an experi-
ence based on sangfroid and on the elimination of surprise is 
something totally unrelated to a pathic aesthetics, which instead 
revolves around the involuntary and first-personal life experience. 
A completely unsurprising experience perhaps is not even a real 
experience. 
 
5. Meaningless affect: political doubts 
Finally, a few words must be spent on the foreseeable objection 
raised by the so-called affect theorists. They would probably claim 
that a shared atmospheric feeling, and therefore also well-being as 
I understand it, is neither a feeling nor an emotion but rather an 
affect, meaning by this a pre-personal and unconscious, formless 
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and pre-linguistic, meaningless and corporeal potential of inten-
sity. In truth, my neo-phenomenological atmospherology has no 
problem defining the felt-bodily resonance to an atmosphere as a 
form of sub-personal bodily thinking, explaining it, according to 
Schmitz’s felt-bodily “economy” and “alphabet”, as an endless 
modification of the contraction-expansion relationship between 
two poles like tightness and wideness. Nor it would have any 
problem considering atmospheres irreducible to the physical-
bodily conscience and to the post-hoc rumination (maybe also 
conventional and ideological) of mind and language. Nevertheless, 
this does not necessarily mean that an atmosphere or well-being 
is an unpredictable and indeterminate cosmic entity that is hardly 
distinguishable from matter movements and involves individuals 
without any regard to its content.6  
In political terms, which are notoriously the most burning 
consequences of the new affect theories, an atmosphere entails its 
own meanings and expresses them through its immanent affor-
dances. A good political or well-being atmosphere, therefore, de-
pends not only on personal taste and/or a certain degree of inten-
sity, but rather appeals to quasi-normative criteria that should be 
able to limit, as far as possible, both toxic and manipulative at-
mospheres and the emotional climates whose undeniable inten-
sity does not necessarily imply a high level of well-being. In short: 
when trying to establish what an atmosphere of well-being is, one 
cannot be content with simply opposing to some manipulated at-
mospheres other more intense but equally manipulated ones.    
Paradoxically, today even neurosciences underline that af-
fect is independent of signi cation and meaning. They have long 
accepted that there is a gap between the subject’s affect and their 
cognition or appraisal, which comes “too late” for reasons, beliefs, 
intentions, and meanings to play the role usually accorded to them 
in action and behaviour. The consciousness-independence of ac-
tion and behaviour, however, does not mean that the brain must 
be considered the privileged site of affective phenomena and that 
                                                          
6 So that when people have different affective responses, they don’t really disagree, but 
are simply different (Leys, 2011, 452). 
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felt-bodily and even physical processes taking place outside the 
brain should be reduced to mere background conditions. Fur-
thermore, it’s by no means necessary to fully accept Libet’s influ-
ential but very controversial7 thesis - according to which the con-
scious mind intervenes half a second too late to play the role usu-
ally attributed to it in human behaviour - in order to admit, quite 
rightly, that free will consists not so much in initiating intentions 
as in responding to them after they arise.  
Also a neo-phenomenological philosophy of atmospheres 
certainly shares the goal of shifting the attention away from mean-
ing or “ideology” and onto the subject’s sub-personal material-
affective responses. It knows only too well  (like rhetoric and 
pragmatist linguistics) that philosophy, science and even common 
sense have overvalued the role of reason and rationality in (at 
least) politics, ethics, and aesthetics, thus disembodying the ways 
in which people think and act and underestimating the fact that 
the conscious meaning of a message is often of less importance 
than its non-conscious affective resonances. But to say, on the ba-
sis of a misunderstood pluralism, that different intensities of affect 
can in uence and transform individuals for better or worse with-
out regard to the content of said affect, and that democracy is con-
sequently not a normative value but just a personal taste, it’s 
really unacceptable. Not all subliminal inclinations are the fruit of 
fraudulent manipulations, just as not all affective intensities are 
equal and equally desirable, otherwise it would be unimaginable 
how a political activist might strategically intervene in a particular 
situation and, what’s worse, democracy would be a political sys-
tem that somehow draws on the same media resources as those 
used by totalitarian regimes. 
What atmospherology is interested in, therefore, is not ven-
turing into this Heraclitean metaphysics of affect, but rather phe-
                                                          
7 Libet imposes an arti cial requirement when he asks his subjects to pay conscious at-
tention to their movements. These experimental movements are part of an overall inten-
tional situation that includes the subjects’ willingness to participate in the experiment 
(exactly like skilled pianists intend to play the music even if they may be unaware of all 
the single movements their ngers must make during a performance) and their knowing 
what actions they were expected to perform. 
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nomenologically delving into different ways of generating atmos-
pheres and different people’s felt-bodily affective reactions to 
them. Sure, today’s renewed debate on Stimmungen and the very 
fact that so many scholars in the humanities and social sciences 
are increasingly fascinated by the idea that political decision is it-
self produced by a series of non-human or pre-subjective forces 
and intensities could also be considered a mere compensatory-
conciliatory expedient, that is, an exquisitely kitsch alibi (Bude 
2016, 32) to underestimate our split and conflictual society. Just 
to dispel that suspicion, today’s affective turn and atmospherology 
ought to include a higher rate of criticism and not simply repeat 
that human beings are bodily creatures imbued with subliminal-
inhuman affective intensities that unconsciously condition their 
beliefs. Even the affect theorists’ recent efforts to avoid a crude 
reductionism by distancing themselves from genetics and deter-
minism is doomed to failure, both because they end up in natural-
ism anyway, even if especially based on a dynamic and non-
deterministic biology, and because they throw the baby out with 
the bathwater by resorting to an all-embracing impersonal affect 
as a deus ex machina that solves every open question. 
The fact that emotion or feeling (in the strict sense) is a sub-
jective-personal but felt-bodily (and not socio-linguistic) sublimi-
nal filtering of an impersonal affect does not imply that one should 
neither consider the mind, as affect theorists do, as a purely dis-
embodied consciousness (hence a new dualism), nor simply take 
impersonal intensities as a new (Kantian) transcendental appara-
tus. Nigel Thrift (2004, 64) is then certainly right in reminding us 
that “political attitudes and statements are partly conditioned by 
intense autonomic bodily reactions that do not simply reproduce 
the trace of a political intention and cannot be wholly recuperated 
within an ideological regime of truth”. Nevertheless, in order to 
avoid any excessive irresponsible non-normative drift, I’d like to 
make a few critical remarks about what I mean by “atmospheric 
competence”.  
In my view, a “good” atmospheric competence should be 
able, first of all, 1) to distinguish between “toxic” and “benign” at-
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mospheres. It must be pointed out that toxic atmospheres, which 
cannot however be reduced to non-atmospheres, are not only 
those arousing stress and distress but also dissuasive-sedative 
ones. Through them, apparatuses aim at defusing any social con-
tradiction with the help both of artificial and conformist attune-
ments and of the inhibiting effects resulting from the alarmist de-
mand, today become obsessive, to regulate every fragment of eve-
ryday experience, possibly through the alibi of privacy and politi-
cal correctness. A good atmospheric competence should then 2) 
accept the fact that, given that there is no undisputed privileged 
place for awareness (especially in our post-traditional societies), 
the best option is to learn to experience very different atmos-
pheric experiences interacting with each other. This could give 
rise to a well-being that, as happens in democracy, fully depends 
on a division of powers (affective in this case) that relativizes their 
impact. Lastly, it should 3) favour and foster the atmospheres in 
which, as happens with trompe l’oeil, an early pathic-immersive 
stage may and should be followed up by a stage which will be nec-
essarily emergent. In this respect, an example of atmospheres that 
are powerful and influential without being oppressive and coer-
cive could precisely be obtained from aesthetic experience: 
through its provocative and irritating impact, in 
fact,contemporary art generates cognitive and affective disconti-
nuities that make a healthy critical distance possible.  
I have looked around very carefully but I don’t see other 
ways to at least partly immunize oneself against today’s wide-
spread atmospherization. The ways that are usually outlined, be 
they romantic-moralistic or cognitive-naturalistic, are too naive 
because they trust respectively in personal freedom and in the 
critical force of scepticism. Sometimes they are so unrealistically 
ascetic as to require a strong and inhuman distance from the af-
fective world, not realising that this lack of a felt-bodily resonance 
is rather the symptom of a psychopathological crisis. My pathic 
aesthetics cannot do more than suggesting the “provisional at-
mospheric morality” summarized a few lines earlier, thus promot-
ing a more in-depth reflection on the complicated relationship be-
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tween the affective and the cognitive realm. Of course, it would be 
very easy and liberating to resolve the issue of well-being once 
and for all by emphatically saying “I don’t care about truth. I want 
happiness”, or, following Bachelard’s rejection of existentialist 
gnosticism, by simply taking comfort in the fact that “Being starts 
with well-being” (Bachelard, 1994, 104). Indeed, even if this were 
true and convincing (which it isn’t), it would still be necessary to 
explain what “happiness” means: a “vast program” that, after all, is 
no easier to solve than well-being. 
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